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Abstract
Social media has become an important part of the
lives of their hundreds of millions of users. Hackers
make use of the large target audience by sending
malicious content, often by hijacking existing accounts.
This phenomenon has caused widespread research on
how to detect hacked accounts, where different
approaches exist. This work sets out to analyze the
possibilities of including the reactions of hacked Twitter
accounts’ peers into a detection system. Based on a
dataset of six million tweets crawled from Twitter over
the course of two years, we select a subset of tweets in
which users react to alleged hacks of other accounts. We
then gather and analyze the responses to those messages
to reconstruct the conversations made. A quantitative
analysis of these conversations shows that 30% of the
users that are allegedly being hacked reply to the
accusations, suggesting that these users acknowledge
that their account was hacked.

1. Introduction
Twitter is a popular microblogging service that
allows users to write short messages, called tweets,
which may not exceed a length of 140 characters. The
last official numbers from May 2015 state that
approximately 500 million tweets were sent every day
and consumed by a total of 310 million active users [1].
Twitter’s popularity in terms of the number of tweets
sent and the number of users active on the platform
every day makes it an interesting target for cybercriminals. In principle, cybercriminals aim to hack
Twitter accounts to spread spam which contain URLS
leading to e.g., phishing websites over these accounts
[2], [3]. On the Twitter platform, tweets appear on the
timeline of all followers of a particular user. Therefore,
cybercriminals aim at hacking accounts with an already
established social network (i.e., accounts with a
substantial number of followers) which allows for
directly delivering spam messages to a multitude of
users. More importantly, in online social networks such
as Twitter, a notion of trust is created between users and
their followers—regardless of whether users actually
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know each other in real life or not [4]. This trust among
users is exploited by cybercriminals as people are more
likely to click on links sent by trusted peers [5], which
naturally is a desirable property for hackers to exploit.
Therefore, cybercriminals are more likely to hack into
accounts with an existing social network than creating
own accounts, which are also more prone to be detected
earlier [2], [6].
Heymann et al. find that there are three different
types of countermeasures that may be used to cope with
spam in social networks: (i) detection, (ii) demotion and
(iii) prevention [7]. During the last years, Twitter has
developed mechanisms for detecting accounts which are
used for spreading spam [2]. Thomas et al. found that
these mechanisms allow for detecting 77% of all Twitter
accounts which are used to spread spam within the first
day of having started to send out malicious contents and
92% of all accounts are detected (and subsequently
suspended) within three days [8], [9]. Approaches for
detecting spam, spamming accounts and hence,
compromised accounts include information about the
content of the messages themselves as well as other
meta-information, such as the amount of follower
relationships a user has [10]–[13].
Zangerle et al. performed an analysis of the reactions
of Twitter users once they found that their account has
been hacked [14]. They find that 27% of those users
change to a new account and 51% of those users send
out a tweet stating that their account was hacked and
apologize for any unsolicited tweets. However, little
research is done on the reactions of the peers of
allegedly hacked users who might even point those users
to their hacked accounts (if the hacked user does not
recognize that the account has been compromised and
used for sending spam). We hypothesize that peers that
use Twitter may be faster in detecting a hack by reading
the posted (possible malicious) content. Therefore, we
are interested in analyzing Twitter conversations
revealing that users might be pointed to a compromised
account by peers. Particularly, we aim to reliably
reconstruct conversations on Twitter, where users point
other users to the fact that their account might have been
hacked (e.g., “@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account
hacked?”) to analyze the behavior of the Twitter users
taking part in these conversations. Subsequently, we
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analyze these tweets to study to which extent such
conversations might be suited to extract hints about
hacked Twitter accounts and to perform a detailed
analysis on how users behave in these conversations.
From a dataset of six million tweets collected over
the course of two years, we extract a subset of tweets
that suggest that peers point each other to the fact that
the other’s account has been hacked and also
incorporate the reaction of the hacked user to these
suggestions. We realize these analyses by using a
supervised machine learning method. The responses of
these alleged victims are then crawled and classified.
Using this method, we show that 30% of the accused
victims respond to the accusations, either confirming a
hack or explaining the situation. We also find that 48%
of all users that actually reply to these allegations,
respond within the first hour after having received a
tweet suggesting that their account might have been
hacked.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we first explain some background of
Twitter and the problem of hacked accounts, including
related work on this topic. Section 3 presents the dataset
underlying the performed analyses. Section 4 presents
the methods utilized for the analyses and Section 5
presents the results. Section 6 presents a discussion of
the results and Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Related Work
Wherever social communication is able to gather a
large audience, misuse of the services is interesting for
hackers. The scenarios of misusing Twitter include
impersonation [15], the creation of fake accounts (socalled “sybils”) [16], phishing [17], malware
distribution [18] or spamming campaigns [19]. Thomas
et al. [8] lay out that URLs that are posted on Twitter
have a significantly higher likelihood of being followed
than URIs in email spam, especially if the user account
posting the link is trustworthy (e.g. in a follower
relationship). They also emphasize that hackers favor
taking control over existing accounts over creating
dedicated spamming accounts, as this increases the trust
between the hacker and the victim as well as creates new
possible attack points, such as direct messages, which
are difficult to analyze because they cannot be crawled
using the public APIs. This finding is also confirmed by
Kanich et al. [20]. However, it is more difficult to obtain
information about direct messages since only the
sending and receiving users have access to their content.
Generally, the detection of hacked accounts has been
tackled from different perspectives. Methods used
include many different aspects, using the content of the
messages sent, geographical and timely information as
well as the social connections on Twitter. Mostly,

approaches for detecting spam relies on a multitude of
features, including content features as similarity of
tweet texts, social network information such as number
of followers, and behavioral features such as the retweet
ration [10], [12], [13], [21]–[23]. Lee et al. create social
honeypots to analyze the behavior of cybercriminals.
Based on the information collected, they propose a spam
identification method [11], [13]. Also, social features of
spamming accounts, the social network of
cybercriminals have been studied [24], [25].
Twitter already has profound methods for detecting
and disabling suspicious user accounts, but no details on
its implementation are publicly available. The user
guidelines merely point out several aspects that a user
should note to avoid account suspension [9].
Furthermore, Twitter provides means to report
spamming user accounts or to report individual spam
tweets [26], [27]. Thomas et al. evaluated the
effectiveness of Twitter’s spam detection methods in
2011 and found that 77% of all spam accounts are
detected within the first 24 hours and 92% of all
spamming accounts are detected and suspended within
three days [8].
Zangerle et al. [14] provide an analysis on how users
whose account was compromised react publicly on
Twitter. They found that 27% of the users change to a
new account, whereas 51% of hacked users apologize
for unsolicited messages and spam. However, the
analyses at hand does not focus on the user whose
account has been compromised, we rather focus on
conversations with peers of this particular user. To the
best of our knowledge, no other approaches so far focus
on the peers of hacked users.

3. Dataset
In the following section, we describe the crawling
methods utilized for the collection of the dataset
underlying the analyses at hand. Subsequently, we
present the main characteristics of the resulting dataset.
In principle, we require a dataset containing tweets
about hacked accounts for the analyses to be performed.
Therefore, we make use of the public Twitter Streaming
API to gather such tweets. The Streaming API provides
means for gathering tweets featuring given filter
keywords and metadata associated with the individual
tweets as JSON-objects [28]. As for the filter keywords
used, we restrain the set of crawled tweets to those
which contain both the keywords “account” and
“hacked” as this method has already been applied by
Zangerle et al. for a similar task [14]. Twitter restricts
the number of tweets which can be crawled freely over
its APIs to approximately 1% of all tweets being sent.
Therefore, the number of tweets delivered is capped by
a rate limit [29]. However, inspecting the number of
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tweets crawled per day shows that the daily number of
tweets is constantly well below this 1% mark and hence,
this fact suggests that no tweets matching our filter
criterion have been capped, ensuring a full coverage of
tweets according to the specified filter criterion.
Applying the described crawling method, we were
able to collect a total of 4.7 million tweets between
November 2012 and October 2014. Table 1 depicts the
main characteristics of the dataset. For all tweets
gathered over the API, Twitter does not only provide the
tweet itself, but also—in case of retweets—the original
tweet which was retweeted. As we consider these
original tweets valuable for the analyses as well, we
extract these and add these to the dataset, which results
in a total of 5,984,406 tweets. As can be seen from
Table 1, 31.82% (1,495,325) of all tweets are retweets
and 54.83% (3,281,005) feature at least one mention of
another Twitter user.
Table 1: Dataset characteristics.

Characteristic
Tweets
Tweets incl. extracted retweets
Distinct authors
Retweets
Tweets containing mentions
Distinct Hashtags
Distinct URLs

Amount
4,698,845
5,984,406
2,670,318
1,495,325
3,281,005
120,690
216,318

The extraction of retweeted tweets from the data
provided by the API revealed that those tweet texts may
have been shortened during the process of retweeting
due to Twitter’s 140 character limitation for tweets. This
behavior is showcased in the following example tweet:
“RT @wayfaringcalum: @Calum5SOS hi cal,I hope
youre having fun in America!! If you happen to see this
pretty please refollow me,someone hack…”. As can be
seen, the tweet no longer contains the word “hacked” as
it was cut off the text of the original tweet due to the
need to adhere to the 140 character limit. To still be able
to also incorporate the full content of such tweets in our
study, we have to fetch the full text of the original tweet
in order to be able to reconstruct the cut off tweet
content. Therefore, we extract the retweeted message’s

full content from the JSON-object of the retweeting
tweet and add these to the dataset as well.
Based on this dataset, we firstly perform a
prefiltering step before being able to perform the actual
analyses. The required prefiltering steps and analysis
methods utilized are described in the following section.

4. Methods
In the following section, we present the methods
utilized for performing the analyses proposed.
In principle, we require a set of messages that
suggest that a Twitter account might have been hacked
to firstly be able to reconstruct conversations about
hacked accounts and to subsequently classify the hacked
users’ responses. Therefore, the messages have to
contain a mention tag of a user and an indication that the
affected account is hijacked to be included in the
analyses.
Starting from the dataset of crawled tweets, we
perform the following analysis steps, which are depicted
in Figure 1: (1) Clean the dataset by removing all
messages that do not contain any mention. (2) Extract a
subset of messages that actually suggest another Twitter
account being hacked. (3) Remove the messages that
mention users that are no longer active on Twitter. (4)
Fetch tweets of the users that were mentioned directly
following the tweet in which the users and the alleged
hack were mentioned. (5) Classify the responses. In
Figure 1, blue wavy blocks represent sets of tweets, the
green rectangles labeled “ML” stand for the machine
learning processes that are performed. The red boxes
denote services provided by Twitter that we utilize over
the according API. These five steps are explained in
detail in the following section.
As each of the first three steps aims to narrow down
the available data to a dataset only containing relevant
messages required for the actual analyses, Table 2
shows the amount of messages left after having
performed each of the steps. We list which filtering step
is performed, followed by the amount of messages that
were left afterwards. Also, we list the number of actually
fetched timelines based on the information gathered
during prefiltering steps 1-3.

Figure 1: Workflow overview
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Table 2: Sizes of intermediate message sets

Step
1
2
3
4

Message set

Amount

All
Mention
Positive
Existing
Fetched timelines

5,984,406
2,266,935
444,315
412,228
54,835

4.1. Removing tweets without mentions
As we require information about users who are
mentioned within the tweets contained in our dataset to
be able to reconstruct conversations about hacked
accounts, the first step is to filter the dataset for all
tweets which actually mention other users. A substantial
amount of tweets within the dataset do not contain any
mentions (e.g., when users state that their own account
was hacked: “Looks like my twitter account got hacked.
I didn’t lose 2.5lbs“).
The JSON file gathered over the Twitter API
contains a separate field for any mention information in
a tweet. This allows to extract information about the
mentioned user account without having to parse the
tweet text. We utilize this information to extract all
tweets that actually contain a mention of another user to
further be processed in the next step. Table 2 shows that
out of the total 5,984,406 messages, 2,266,935 tweets
(37.88%) are left to process in the next step.

4.2. Extracting tweets suggesting hacks
The word “hacked” can describe a variety of
different scenarios, but for the performed analyses only
suggestions of another Twitter account being hacked are
relevant (e.g., “@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account
hacked?”). We eliminate different other cases such as
the mention of a different kind of account being hacked
(e.g., “@AmpersUK Looks like you Gmail account
hasbeen hacked”) by using supervised machine
learning. Along the lines of Zangerle et al. [14] and also
following research trends [16], we use a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [30] classifier with a linear kernel.

Also, we utilize a Term-Frequency vs. Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) [31] vectorizer to
compute the feature vectors representing each message.
The parameters of the classifier and vectorizer are
determined using a grid search approach [32], which
internally uses 5-fold cross validation. Table 3 shows
the parameters that performed best for the SVM and the
TF-IDF vectorizer when the grid search was optimized
for the f1-score. We make use of the free python library
scikit-learn [33] for all machine learning processes. As
for linguistic features of the tweet texts being analyzed,
we follow previous research [34], [35] and performed
lemmatization [36] (i.e., we map all words to their basic
word form).
Table 3: Best parameters for SVM and TF-IDF
vectorizer

SVM parameter
C
TF-IDF parameter
n-gram size
Max. document frequency
Min. document frequency

Best value
1.0
Best value
(1, 3)
0.9
0.0001

Figure 2 depicts the workflow of the machine learning
process. First, a subset of messages is manually
classified (1). A TF-IDF vectorizer calculates the
feature vectors (2). Our workflow includes a chi-squaretest (3), which filters the feature vectors to leave the
most significant ones. However, the overall
performance is best if all features are used. The SVM is
then trained based on the feature vectors (4) and
subsequently predicts the classes of the remaining
unclassified tweets (5). In Figure 2, the blue wavy boxes
represent sets of messages. The green rectangles denote
machine learning methods we utilize as provided by the
scikit-learn
toolkit [33].
Intermediate
feature
representations are displayed by yellow rhombs.

Figure 2: Machine learning process
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Table 4: Confusion matrix

Is positive
Is negative

Predicted positive
True positive (TP)
False negative (FN)

Predicted negative
False positive (FP)
True negative (TN)

To evaluate the performance of the classification,
different methods can be used. Table 4 shows the
confusion matrix of classification and depicts all
possible combinations of a sample being classified.
Based on this confusion matrix, traditional IR quality
measures like precision and recall [36] may be defined.
𝑇𝑃
Precision is defined as 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃 and describes how
many of the predicted samples are actually relevant.
𝑇𝑃
Recall is defined as 𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁 and describes how
many of the available relevant samples were classified
as such. It can be seen that the two values on their own
are not meaningful for our use-case, as they are easy to
optimize. A classifier that predicts all samples as
relevant has a perfect recall of 1.0, whereas a classifier
that randomly guesses one positive sample as such and
ignores all other has a precision of 1.0. Therefore, we
require a combination of those two measures to evaluate
the performance of the classifier and propose to utilize
PR-curves as well as the f1-score as described in the
following. The precision vs. recall curve (PR-curve) is a
quality measure that visualizes how the precision and
recall values change with varying discrimination
thresholds of the classifier. The f1-score is the harmonic
mean of precision and recall and is calculated as 𝑓1 =
𝑝𝑟⋅𝑟𝑒𝑐
2⋅
.

Figure 3 shows the precision vs. recall curve for the
performed classification step. The f1-values for the four
evaluated classification methods dealing with class
imbalance (undersampling, oversampling, class
weighting, no countermeasures taken) obtained by a 5fold cross validation are listed in Table 5. As can be
seen, none of the analyzed methods outperforms the
plain imbalance-unaware classification. Therefore, we
utilize the imbalance-unaware classification for step 2
of our analysis workflow.

Figure 3: Precision vs. recall of imbalance
countermeasures

𝑝𝑟+𝑟𝑒𝑐

A classifier usually performs best if it is trained with
the same amount of samples for each class [37], [38].
The training set consists of 3,650 manually classified
messages that were randomly chosen from the data set,
out of which 455 are labelled as relevant. To cope with
the imbalance of classes, there are a number of
approaches:
 Sampling: by removing overrepresented samples
(undersampling)
or
duplicating
existing
underrepresented samples (oversampling), a
balance in the class sizes can be achieved. In
contrast to other sophisticated, domain-aware
oversampling approaches like SMOTE [39], we
used a blind copying approach where existing
samples are randomly duplicated. Research on
whether under- or oversampling yields better
results are inconclusive [37], therefore we
evaluated both of these methods.
 Automatic class weighting: we use the built-in
weighting function of scikit-learn, which
incorporates weights inversely proportional to the
class frequencies into the classification
process [40].

Table 5: F1-scores of class imbalance
countermeasures (step 2)

Method
Plain
Undersample
Oversample
Class weighting

F1-score
0.73
0.72
0.70
0.67

In the performed classification step, 444,315
messages were classified as relevant, which amounts to
19.6% of the tweets remaining resulting from step 1.

4.3. Removing inactive users
The next step in the analysis workflow aims to
remove inactive users from the dataset to speed up the
subsequent fetching step. The bottleneck of the analysis
workflow in regards to computing time is the rate
limitation of the Twitter API for step 4, which only
allows fetching 200 messages at a time, with an
additional limit of 180 requests per 15-minute time
slot [41]. Therefore, we aim to keep the number of API-
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calls to be made for the analysis as low as possible by
removing inactive users from the dataset (and hence,
from future API calls). Twitter offers an additional API
endpoint to fetch users, which allows to check the status
of 200 users per request. If a username is not returned
by the API, that user account is either inactive (e.g.,
Twitter suspended the account due to sending spam) or
deliberately deleted by the user. Using this method,
inactive users are removed and the remaining set of step
2 is narrowed down to 412,228 tweets, implying that
7.2% of the tweets within the dataset were composed by
users who were no longer active or banned from the
Twitter platform (32,987 of 444,315 tweets) and hence,
removed from the dataset.

4.4. Fetching responses
In the next step, we aim to actually fetch responses
to tweets which allegedly report a hacked account (as
extracted by the previously performed steps). As
described in Section 2, Twitter offers a dedicated field
for storing the original message if a user replies to a
tweet. An obvious way to fetch responses is to use the
search API to fetch messages that directly reply to
tweets assuming a hack. However, general responses
that address multiple users often do not use mentions at
all, (e.g., “sorry for any recently sent spam messages my twitter account was hacked…”). To be able to
include those responses as well, we fetch all messages
that were sent by the mentioned user account directly
after the mentioning tweet was published on the Twitter
platform.
Twitter’s timeline API endpoint allows to fetch a
maximum of 200 message per request [42]. To specify
the time of the desired messages in a request, two fields
since_id and max_id can be provided, which act as a
lower and upper bound for tweet ids. Figure 4 depicts
the upper and lower bounds of the timeline API. As
lower bound, the mentioning tweet can be used.
However, due to the tweets being sent some time in the
past, the correct upper bound (i.e., the length of the
timespan to be crawled) is not known in advance. The
only way to ensure all relevant messages are fetched is
to choose the upper bound in the present, which causes
Twitter to return the latest 200 messages as a response.
After receiving this batch, one can set the max_id to the
earliest received message and continue in this manner
until the timespan of interest is covered.
In addition to a 180 requests per 15-minute timeslot
limitation, Twitter only allows users to fetch the latest
3,200 messages from another user’s timeline, meaning
that fetching possible responses that were sent too long
in the past is not feasible.

Figure 4: Fetching timelines

To prevent fetching unnecessary messages only to
discover that the timespan of interest is not available, a
preliminary batch can be requested, with the max_id
parameter set to the id of the mention. The since_id just
has to be set early enough in the past to ensure the
preliminary batch to return anything, so it is set to zero.
If this request returns any messages, the timespan of
interest is guaranteed to be available for crawling.
Figure 5 shows the schema of this preliminary batch.
When the preliminary batch does not return any
results for a user, that user is ignored for all further
processing as no information of the desired timespan
can be gathered. Otherwise, we fetch the responses until
reaching the timespan of interest and beyond.
Out of the 412,228 messages that mention users
allegedly being hacked, the timelines and hence,
responses of 54,835 users have been fetched from
Twitter, where a response represents the overall set of
messages that user sent after the mention incident. The
presented method allows for fetching a total of 54,835
timelines which represent the input for the subsequent
classification step.

Figure 5: Preliminary batch

4.5. Classifying responses
The last step of the analysis workflow is dedicated
to the actual classification and analysis of the
conversations gathered. For the manual classification, a
response in general is considered relevant when at least
one message in the 30 messages following the mention
are answering suggestions, either directly (e.g.,
“@howly Thanks! I will look into it!”) or indirectly
(e.g., “You can stop writing me, I know I was hacked”).
Further analysis of the predicted data shows that 95% of
the responses occurred within the first 10 messages that
the accused user wrote after the mention. Hence, we
argue that analyzing a total of 30 messages following
the mention delivers a sufficiently large time window
for the analysis.
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The classification of the responses is done in the
same way as in step 2, using a linear SVM and a TF-IDF
vectorizer. However, the class imbalance is more
substantial than in the first classification step: of 41,569
randomly chosen and manually classified messages, 617
were selected as relevant. The same methods as in step
2 were applied to cope with the imbalance. Table 6
shows the f1-scores for the tested methods. The
undersampling method outperforms the others by a
small margin, therefore we chose to use undersampling
for the final prediction step.
In an additional experiment, we also performed
evaluations regarding linguistic features of the tweets.
Therefore, we removed stopwords, hashtags, mentions
or URLs (and any subset of these features) from the
tweet text before computing the TDF/IDF vectors.
However, none of the approaches evaluated led to a
substantial increase of the classification performance in
regards to F1-scores of the SVM as can be seen from
Table 7. Hence, we did not include any of these
measures in the final classification step performed.
Table 6: F1-scores of class imbalance
countermeasures (step 5)

Method
Plain
Undersampling
Oversampling
Class weighting

F1-score
0.77
0.73
0.78
0.70

Table 7: F1-scores of hashtag, mention and URL
removal

Remove
hashtags

Remove
mentions

Remove
URLs
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

F1-score
0.760
0.759
0.758
0.761
0.753
0.759
0.757
0.758

mentions. From these responses, we find 30.0% (a total
of 16,452 messages) of the messages being relevant in
terms of the user replying to the accusing mention. By
using the text content of the messages rather than relying
on direct answers, we are able to include loose
conversations that are not directed to single users but
address multiple possible mentioning peers (e.g. “sorry
for any recently sent spam messages – my twitter
account was hacked…”). Using Twitter-specific input
sanitizing methods such as removing hashtags,
mentions or URLs did not show substantial changes in
regards to the classification quality (f1-score).
When it comes to the suitability of extracted
conversations for detecting hacked and compromised
Twitter accounts, we observe that by analyzing the
peers’ reactions instead of the allegedly hacked account
itself, we are able to detect the distribution of spam on
multiple levels, including direct messages, which are
impossible to directly analyze due to Twitter’s privacy
restrictions. This shows that the proposed method may
also be used to detect malicious behavior on other
contexts than Twitter itself.
Regarding the reaction of users once they are pointed
to the fact that their account might have been hacked,
we find that 30% of the users that are accused of being
hacked generally respond. The reactions cover a large
variety of possible scenarios, including confirmations of
any suspicions (e.g. "@katiekellypoet thanks for letting
me know Hun"), but also explanations of the situation
(e.g. "haha no that was my brother").
We also analyzed the timespan until users who are
pointed to the fact that their account might have been
hacked, react to these allegations. In this analysis, we
find that 80% of all users within the dataset respond
within the first 24 hours. More importantly, 48% of the
replies were sent within the first hour after having
received the hint that their account might have been
hacked. When counting the number of tweets that have
been sent between the time of receiving the hint and the
actual response tweet, we observe a similar behavior:
95% of all responses to hints are contained within the 10
messages sent, where 53% of all users make use of the
first tweet for replying to the alleged hack of their
accounts.

5. Results

6. Discussion

In the following section, we present the results of the
analyses performed by applying the methods described
in Section 4 to the dataset presented in Section 3.
As for reliably reconstructing conversations on
Twitter up to the point, where a user is pointed to his or
her compromised account, we observe that by utilizing
the presented research method, we are able to
reconstruct conversations of 13.3% of all analyzed

In this section, we further discuss the findings
presented in the previous section. Also, we shed light on
the limitations of the proposed approach and present
plans for future work following up the current study.
Firstly, we find that conversations can be
reconstructed reliably. However, one limitation to the
presented analyses is the fact that the base dataset was
crawled 2014. Due to the fact that Twitter’s API only
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allows for fetching the last 3,200 messages of any given
user, part of the conversations could not be
reconstructed due to the amount of time passed (and
hence, the number of tweets sent). In total, for 13.3% of
all users which were filtered to be relevant during the
preprocessing steps, we are able to reconstruct the
conversations by fetching the according timelines,
which certainly poses a limitation. However, we argue
that using the dataset at hand, this analyses can still be
regarded as a baseline for such analyses. To be able to
increase the amount of users that responses can be
fetched from, a future application could use real-time
data of users that occur in mentions. This way, the 3,200
messages limit of Twitter is no longer a problem.
The complexity of natural languages often prevents
the reconstruction of a conversation without having
knowledge about its context. Therefore, a correct
classification of a message is often impossible for
humans too. The proposed method reaches f1-scores
ranging from 0.73 to 0.78. This certainly poses a
limitation to our approach. However, we argue that even
in this case, our findings provide a baseline for further
studies—even if more conversations might be extracted
given more recent data. To increase the performance of
the machine learning steps in future work, we aim to
compare different machine learning methods for the
given classification problem (kernel-based SVM, naïve
Bayes or Random Forest).
Another limitation to the presented approach lies in
the context of messages. Consider a situation in which a
user apologizes to a larger audience. Even if the user
was notified by a peer, there is no guarantee that this
message caused that user to be aware of the hacked
account as we are not able to reliably detect what
actually made the user realize that his/her account has
been hacked. An in-depth classification and qualitative
analysis of the responses may give an insight on this
situation. We plan to carry out such an evaluation in
future work.
To get a deeper understanding of possibly different
types of messages within the dataset, we performed an
explorative study on the conversations. This analysis
showed that there are different types of tweets and
responses as discussed in the following.
As for the initial tweets (i.e., tweets that describe an
allegedly hacked account), we observe the following
types of tweets:
 Messages that plainly suggest a hack (e.g.,
“@AllRiseSilver is your twitter account hacked?”)
 Suggestions to take a specific counter action. Thus,
users suggest the victims to change their password
(e.g., “@aam429 I think your account has been
hacked change your password good luck”) or to
check applications which were granted permissions
(e.g., “@brijesh58 Did you DM me any link ? Or is

your account hacked ? Check apps you have granted
permission.”)
 Retweets of the alleged spam; possibly also
containing a comment on the content of the retweeet
(e.g. “ Bwahahaha! Is your account got hacked bro?
RT @owlcity: j0mbl0 h4h4h4 lu k3n4 v12u5 4l4y
y4? k37ul424n cy4ph4 wkwkwk - -“)
 Detailed description of the source of the spam attack
in detail (e.g., “@BeckyBeckyh123 I think your
account has been hacked, just received a spurious
DM from you”).
 Messages referring to the content of the spam (e.g.,
“@jessicalacie I think you’ve been hacked, got a
dieting DM from your account.”).
As can be seen from these types of initial tweets, peers
who realize that a user they follow has been allegedly
hacked, include a different level of detail about the
alleged hack into their tweet.
Analogous to the mentions, we also performed an
explorative study on the responses to the initial tweets
(as described previously) of the victims of hack attacks.
We again find that there are different patterns how
allegedly hacked users react:
 Some users clearly are victims of misuse and have
not yet regained control over their account or
possibly not even noticed that their account was
hacked (e.g. “Quickly burn off stomach fat while
dropping
25lbs
in
a
month
using
http://t.co/BWn4JYPYWB”).
 Others state a direct answer to a suspicion and also
react to specific measures that the mentioning user
suggests (e.g. “@Alisha_Salik thanks dude! Will do
[change password]”)
 More general answers often respond to possibly
multiple mentioning users (e.g. “sorry for any rogue
DMs, my account got hacked”)
As for the replies to the tweets hinting the user that
his/her account might have been hacked, we observe
that those answers are either directed at the initial tweet
it followed or to a more general audience, when the user
apologizes for the unsolicited tweets and direct
messages. These findings are in line with those by
Zangerle et al. [14] who generally analyzed how users
react once they find that their account was
compromised.
The fact that users respond quickly (80% within 24
hours, 48% within the first 60 minutes) suggests that
being notified is of great importance to them.
Generally, we consider Twitter a single
representative of online social networks and argue that
Twitter may only serve as a showcase for such an
approach which may be generalized to other online
social networks as well.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the behavior and reaction of
Twitter users whose account has been compromised and
their peer. We present a method to perform such an
analysis based on a dataset of tweets about hacked
accounts collected over the course of two years. Our
methods allow to perform a reliable reconstruction of
conversations about a hacked Twitter account. We
further find that 30% of the accused victims respond to
the accusations, either confirming a hack or explaining
the situation. Moreover, we find that 48% of all users
that actually reply to these allegations, respond within
the first hour after having received the hinting tweet.
Similarly, 53% of all users within our dataset make use
of the first tweet to respond to the allegations after
having been informed that their account might have
been hacked.
Future work includes carrying out a deeper
qualitative analysis of the conversations revealed by the
presented extraction methods, gathering a more
extensive and up-to-date dataset and further
improvements of the classification methods used.
Furthermore, we are interested in comparing the
accuracy and the time passed until a hack can be
detected to existing quantitative approaches. Another
interesting topic would be to analyze the content of the
tweets regarding contained topics or sentiment.
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